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Pervasive Not Perverse:
Semi-Sovereigns as the Global Norm
Stephen D. Krasner*
Introduction
The contemporary world is beset by conflicts and issues that seem to chal-
lenge the utility of sovereignty as conventionally understood. Ethnic
groups slaughter each other in the former Yugoslavia and in parts of central
Africa. Israelis and Palestinians make apparently incompatible and irrec-
oncilable demands about the same territory. Growing globalization seems
to prevent national governments from exercising effective control over their
own macro-economic and social policies. Transnational private groups
organize against governments without regard to territorial boundaries. The
state system, which many analysts see as having been established by the
Peace of Westphalia in 1648,1 appears to be under an unprecedented level
of challenge along many fronts. The whole notion of sovereignty appears
fragile, incorporeal, undefinable, and perhaps inconsequential for the mod-
em world.
These attitudes about the changing nature, perhaps the irrelevance, of
sovereignty are historically myopic, analytically flaccid, and empirically
inaccurate. Sovereignty has always been problematic. No element of sover-
eignty-control, authority, non-intervention, recognition, even territorial-
ity-has ever gone without challenge. Unlike the situation in well-
established domestic polities, which are characterized by widely shared
values and deeply embedded institutional structures, the most important of
which is a judiciary that can decide among competing claims, institutional
arrangements in the international system have always been weak. The
international system is an anarchy; there is no final court of appeal. Norms
and principles associated with sovereignty have often been in tension with
each other. In some cases, they are logically contradictory. Non-interven-
tion in the internal affairs of other states is one central principle associated
with sovereignty, but if the international environment is anarchical, there is
no reason to suppose that states would not intervene in the affairs of other
states. Self-help and non-intervention are contradictory.
* Department of Political Science, Stanford University.
1. For examples of this view of Westphalia, see Paul Krugman, What Should Trade
Negotiators Negotiate About?, 35 J. EcoN. LIT. 119 (1997); J.L. B~iERLY, THE LAW OF
NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 5 (Sir Humphrey
Waldock ed., 6th Ed., 1963); CHARLES TILLY, COERCION, CAPITAL, Am EUROPEAN STATES,
AD 990-1990, at 167 (1990); GIDEON GOTTLIEB, NATIONS AGAINST STATE: A NEW
APPROACH TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND THE DECLINE OF SovEREiGNTY 24 (1993); TJ. LAW-
RENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 116 (7th ed. 1923).
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Historically, one or the other of the major principles associated with
sovereignty has always been under challenge. The state system did not
begin with the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, a document that was filled
with contradictory principles that reflected both medieval and more mod-
em concerns. Territorial states existed before Westphalia and other forms
of political organization, including the Holy Roman Empire, persisted long
after the Peace was signed. All of the major international treaties of the last
several hundred years have included contradictory principles, especially
involving non-intervention and autonomy on the one hand and various
efforts to exercise external authority on the other. Only a very few states
have actually possessed all of the major attributes that are associated with
sovereignty-territoriality, autonomy, recognition, and effective control-the
United States being the most obvious case. At the other extreme, states like
the eastern European satellites during the Cold War enjoyed territory and
recognition, yet their autonomy and control were severely compromised.2
Hence, in some sense, almost all of the states of the world have been
semi-sovereigns. Rarely have states enjoyed full autonomy. Any member
state of the European Union is now a semi-sovereign, for the decisions of a
supra-national judicial body, the European Court of Justice, have
supremacy and direct effect. All of the signatory states of the European
Human Rights Convention have agreed to give their own citizens the right
to bring cases directly to the European Court of Human Rights. Any state
that borrows money from the International Monetary Fund, the World
Bank, or another international financial institution is subject to condition-
ality requirements that involve questions of what the World Bank now
terms good governance, such as the creation of commissions that are
authorized to limit corruption. Taiwan, another poignant example, pos-
sesses an independent government but it is not internationally recognized.
The semi-sovereign character of many, almost all, of the states in the
contemporary international system and many states in the past, suggests
that stable solutions to international conflicts do not depend on conform-
ity with all of the principles that are conventionally associated with sover-
eignty. Violations of sovereignty related principles, especially the norm of
non-intervention and respect for autonomy, can be functional and stabiliz-
ing. Stability depends not on conformity with some idealized notion of
sovereignty but rather on whether or not agreements have been entered
into voluntarily. Coercive practices rarely provide stable solutions over the
long term. External actors can coercively maintain stability in a particular
situation for some period of time. For the intervenor, however, the costs of
military intervention and threats have usually outweighed the benefits.
The staying power of major powers has been weak. The United States may
have cut and run when a dozen or so American troops were killed in
Somalia, but this event was only emblematic of a more general pattern.
Even the Soviet Union decided in the end that the use of force in Eastern
2. ZBIGNEw K. BRZEZINSKI, THE SoviEr BLOC: UNITY AND CONFLICT 90-94, 119-21
(rev. ed. 1971).
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Europe was incompatible with its own interests; it was a decision, however,
which Mikhail Gorbachev and the last leaders of the U.S.S.R. might have, in
retrospect, regretted. Unless external actors can find and support local
interlocutors, efforts to create viable solutions to specific issues within a
state by violating the sovereignty norm of non-intervention are likely to fail.
With local allies, however, semi-sovereign entities can be perfectly viable,
perhaps even more viable than fully sovereign states.
I. Alternative Meanings of Sovereignty
Sovereignty has engendered such confusion in part because the term itself
has been used in several different ways. It has referred to domestic political
structures and control, to the exclusion of external authority, and to prac-
tices associated with international recognition. These three different ways
in which the term has been used-domestic sovereignty, Westphalian sover-
eignty, and international legal sovereignty-embody different rules and
norms and emphasize different behavioral phenomena.
The classic conceptualization of sovereignty, associated with the work
of Bodin and Hobbes, focused on issues related to domestic sovereignty.
3
Bodin and Hobbes, writing in the midst of the religious wars in France and
Britain, were anxious to establish some single source of law within the
state.4 Above all they wanted to provide a basis for order and, having
established such a basis, limit any possible challenges to legitimated
authority.5 For Bodin and Hobbes, the alternative to some single legitimate
source of law was anarchy. Order was paramount; justice was secondary.
Revolt against legitimate authority could never be justified.6 For Hobbes,
the sovereign ruler was the great Leviathan, although it would be prudent
for the sovereign to rule wisely lest excess ambition precipitate foreign dis-
aster and place his subjects in fear of their lives, a situation in which they
might cease to obey. Bodin argued that there must be some single source
of the law in any stable polity and he suggested that a monarchical form of
government was superior to either a democracy, in which the many were
the source of the law, or an aristocracy, in which the few were the source of
the law.7 Although the monarch was the source of law, his authority
derived, according to Bodin, from God. The monarch was bound to act
justly and obligated to obey treaties into which he or she had entered with
other sovereign rulers.8
3. JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY: FOUR CHAPTERs FROM THE Six BooKs OF THE COM-
MONvEALTH (Julian H. Franklin ed. & trans., 1992); THOMs HOBBEs, LEVATHAN OR THE
MAT-rER, FORME AND POWER OF A COMMONWEALTH (Michael Oakshoft ed., 1960).
4. F.H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY 14445 (2d ed. 1986); BR1ULY, supra note 1, at 65.
5. GEORGE H. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY (3d ed. 1961) (Chapter 20);
HINSLEY, supra note 4, at 120; BoDIN, supra note 3, at 120.
6. QUENTIN SKINNER, 2 THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITicAL THOUGHT 284-87
(1978).
7. BODIN, supra note 3, at 8, 10, 13-14.
8. Id.; SiaNNER, supra note 6, at 289.
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The emphasis that Bodin and Hobbes placed on some single source of
authority, some single originator of law, has disappeared from modem
political thought. Stable polities have taken many different forms-auto-
cratic and democratic, federal and unitary, parliamentary and presidential.
Nevertheless, the central characteristic of domestic sovereignty remains the
authority structure within a given state.
The second element of domestic sovereignty is control. Authority
does not guarantee control.9 Authority involves questions of whether or
not an agent is regarded as having a legitimate right to act in a particular
sphere-a policeman can make arrests but cannot give course grades; an
internal revenue agent can make judgments about tax payments but cannot
activate the military reserves. Control involves the actual exercise of
authority-the police might not be able to control crime; tax collectors
might not be able to collect taxes. With the ratification of the Eighteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, the government of the United States tried
to enforce the prohibition against the production, sale, and importation of
intoxicating liquors for more than a decade. When it was unable to do so,
the Twenty-first Amendment ended this exercise.
Many recent discussions about the erosion of sovereignty have empha-
sized the loss of state control over transborder movements rather than over
exclusively domestic activities. 10 High levels of capital mobility, it has
been suggested, erode the ability of the state to pursue an independent
monetary policy.1 Disease vectors move across continents with the speed
of modem jet planes. Modem communications-telephones, fax, e-mail-
make it easier for non-governmental organizations to coordinate their activ-
ities in many different countries. Multinational corporations source com-
ponents around the world. These transborder flows ostensibly make it
more difficult for states to exercise effective control within their own
borders.
The actual extent to which globalization has eroded state control is
much less certain than many popular accounts suggest. There is still a
great deal of variation among national economic policies with regard to
social welfare and taxation, much more variation than naive versions of
globalization would suggest possible. Even capital market integration, the
area where globalization is supposedly most advanced (one frequently
alluded to figure is the trillion dollar a day foreign exchange market) is very
far from perfect.' 2 Regardless of the empirical accuracy of arguments
9. Janice E. Thomson, State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap
Between Theory and Empirical Research, 39 IN'L STUD. Q. 2 (June 1995), at 214.
10. JAMES ROsENAu, TURBULENCE IN WORLD POLITICS: A THEORY OF CHANGE AND CON-
TINUITY (1990); RICHARD N. COOPER, THE ECONOMICS OF INTERDEPENDENCE: ECONOMIC
POLICY IN THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY (1968).
11. For a critical view of this perspective, see Eric Helleiner, A Challenge to the Sov-
ereign State: Financial Globalization and the Westphalian World Order (Paper prepared
for the workshop "State and Sovereignty in the World Economy," Laguna Beach, Feb.
1997).
12. For a very well documented discussion that demonstrates that the level of state
control is much higher than many discussions of globalization suggest, see Geoffrey
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about globalization, the almost conventional assertion that sovereignty is
being eroded by transborder flows is an illustration of sovereignty under-
stood as control. Domestic sovereignty, a concept which can be traced
back to Bodin and Hobbes, involves both the nature of domestic authority
structures and the ability of any such structures to exercise effective con-
trol over both transborder flows and exclusively domestic activities.
The second meaning of sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, is
concerned with establishing the status of a political entity in the interna-
tional system. Is a state recognized by other states? Is it accepted as a
juridical equal? Are its representatives entitled to diplomatic immunity?
Can it be a member of international organizations? Can it enter into agree-
ments with other entities? This is the concept used most frequently in
international legal scholarship, but it has been employed by scholars and
practitioners of international relations more generally.13
The classic model of international law is a replication of the liberal
theory of the state. The state is treated at the international level as analo-
gous to the individual at the national level. Sovereignty, independence,
and consent are comparable to the position that the individual has in the
liberal theory of the state. States are equal in the same way that individuals
are equal.1
4
Almost all rulers have wanted international legal sovereignty, the rec-
ognition of other states, because it provides them with both material and
normative resources. International legal sovereignty is a ticket of admis-
sion. It gives a state certain basic rights in the international arena includ-
ing juridical equality, the right to consent to international law, and the
ability to enter into treaties. 15 Recognition provides the acts of a state with
protection from legal attacks in the judicial systems of other states; the act
of state doctrine holds, in the words of one U.S. Supreme Court decision,
that "[e]very sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judg-
ment on the acts of the government of another done within its own terri-
tory."16 Recognition also provides immunity from both civil and criminal
actions for diplomatic representatives.' 7 In addition, international recogni-
tion can be a signal to domestic constituents, affecting the level of support
for a specific government. The People's Republic of China has assiduously
Garrett, The Nation-State in the Global Economy: Obstinate or Obsolete,__ INT'L ORG. __
(forthcoming). For an important early analysis by economists on the surprising lack of
international capital market integration, see Martin Feldstein & Charles Horioka,
Domestic Savings and International Capital Flows, 90 ECON. J. 314 (1980).
13. OPPE HEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 14, 158 (Sir RobertJennings & Sir Arthur Watts
eds., 1992) [hereinafter OPPENHEM]; MIcHAEL Ross FowLER &JuLIE MARIE BUNCK, LAW,
POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN STATE: THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 12 (1995); Thomson, supra note 9, at 219.
14. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE LJ. 2403, 2479-80 (1991);
BRIERLY, supra note 1, at 37-40.
15. FoWLER & BUNCK, supra note 13, at 12; OPPENHEIM, supra note 13, §§ 47, 107;
Thomson, supra note 9, at 219.
16. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
17. OPPENHEIM, supra note 13, §§ 492-512, at 1072-97.
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attempted to prevent other states from acting in ways that might suggest
that Taiwan or Tibet are independent states. 8 China protested against the
visit of the President of Taiwan to the United States, even though the trip
was organized around President Lee's return to his alma mater, Cornell
University. 19 The Dalai Lama was not given a formal presidential-level
meeting with Clinton when the two met in the spring of 1997, due to Amer-
ican concerns about antagonizing China.20 At least one motivation for
Chinese policy is the fear that diplomatic recognition of Taiwan or Tibet
might increase instability within China.
21
Recognition has never been automatic. It has always been a political
act. The criteria that states invoke have varied over time and have included
the ability to defend and protect a defined territory, the existence of an
established government, the presence of a population, and the absence of
any formal obligation to submit actions to some external authority.
22
Regardless of the historical moment, the criteria in vogue have never been
consistently applied. States with effective control over their own territory
have not been recognized, such as China and the Soviet Union when their
respective communist regimes first gained control. 23 Entities that are
devoid of independence, have been accepted as members of international
organizations. For example, India was a member of the League of Nations
even though it was a colony of the British Empire.
24
The third way in which the term sovereignty has been used is West-
phalian sovereignty. The Westphalian model is an institutional arrange-
ment for organizing political life that is based on two principles:
territoriality and autonomy. 25 States exist in specific territories. Within
these territories, domestic political authorities are the only arbiters of legiti-
mate behavior.
The basic rule of Westphalian sovereignty is non-intervention in the
internal affairs of other states. This rule has virtually nothing to do with
the Peace of Westphalia signed in 1648. In fact, that document established
a regime for religious toleration in Germany that violated the principle of
non-intervention. 26 The principle of non-intervention was first explicitly
18. Samuel S. Kim, Taiwan and the International System: The Challenge of Legitima-
tion, in TA wAN IN WORLD AARS 145, 145-79 (Robert G. Sutter & William R. Johnson
eds., 1994).
19. Elaine Sciolino, Angered Over Taiwan, China Recalls Its Ambassador in U.S., N.Y.
TIMEs, June 17, 1995, at 5.
20. Clinton Visits Dalai Lama Informally, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1997, at A3.
21. Why Taiwan Scares China, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 19, 1996, at A23.
22. FowIER & BUNCK, supra note 13, at chap. 2; Thomson, supra note 9, at 228;
OPPENHri-M, supra note 13, § 55; Beverly Crawford, Explaining Defection from Interna-
tional Cooperation: Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia, 48 WORLD POL. 500
(1996).
23. OPPENHEIM, supra note 13, at 148-50, 158-73.
24. Id. at 145-46.
25. Thomson, supra note 9, at 219, 227; John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and
Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47 Ir'L ORG. 152 (1993).
26. Stephen D. Krasner, Westphalian and All That, in IDEAS AND FOEIGN POLICY
(Judith Goldstein & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 1993).
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articulated by Wolff and Vattel during the latter part of the 18th century.
Wolff wrote in the 1760s that, "[tlo interfere in the government of another,
in whatever way indeed that may be done is opposed to the natural liberty
of nations, by virtue of which one is altogether independent of the will of
other nations in its action."2 7 During the 19th century, the Latin American
states, which were relatively weak, were the strongest advocates of non-
intervention. Two doctrines illustrate such advocacy. The objective of the
Calvo and Drago doctrines, both articulated by Argentinean jurists, was to
delegitimate European gunboat diplomacy, the use of force to collect pub-
lic and private debts.
28
If non-intervention is the norm, what constitutes intervention? Inter-
national lawyers have emphasized coercion as a critical component of
intervention. For instance, Oppenheim's text maintains that intervention is
a situation where one state engages in forcible or dictatorial measures
related to matters over which another state has the right to exercise sover-
eignty such as "its political, economic, social and cultural systems, and its
foreign policy."129 The intervention must be coercive. Non-forcible acts,
such as withholding recognition, withdrawing aid, discontinuing exports,
or lodging a complaint, do not constitute intervention.30 Weaker states
have often argued for a broader definition of what constitutes intervention
or, conversely, a more relaxed specification of coercion. For example, the
Charter of the Organization of American States stipulates that:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.
The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other
form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State
or against its political, economic, and cultural elements.
3 1
27. CHRISTIAN WOLFF, Jus GENTIRUM METHODO ScIENTIFcA PETRACTATUM § 256
(Joseph H. Drake trans., 1934) (originally published 1764), quoted in ANN VAN WYREN
THOMAS & AJ. THOMAS, NON INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS 5
(1956). Vattel reasoned from the logic of the state of nature: If men were equal in the
state of nature, then states were also free and equal and living in a state of nature. For
Vattel, a small republic was no less a sovereign state than a powerful kingdom. Vattel
wrote that no state had the right to intervene in the internal affairs of other states. He
applied this argument to non-European as well as European states claiming that:
The Spaniards violated all rules when they set themselves up as judges of the
Inca Athualpa. If that prince had violated the law of nations with respect to
them, they would have had a right to punish him. But they accused him of
having put some of his subjects to death, of having had several wives, &c.-
things, for which he was not at all accountable to them; and, to fill up the mea-
sure of their extravagant injustice, they condemned him by the laws of Spain.
EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAv OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAv OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 155 (Joseph Chitty
trans., 1852). See also BRIERLY, supra note 1, at 37-40.
28. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 27, at 56-62.
29. OPPENHEIM, supra note 13, at 431.
30. Id. at 430-34.
31. Charter of the OAS, quoted in Lori Damrosch, Changing Conceptions of Interven-
tion in International Law, in EMERGING NoRmS OFJUSTIFIED INTERvENrON: A COLLECTION
OF ESSAYS FROM A PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 94 (Laura W.
Reed & Carl Kayser eds., 1993).
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These weaker states see the concept of sovereignty as a defense mechanism
against aggression.
Using a more expansive conceptualization of intervention, Westpha-
lian sovereignty is violated when an external actor, usually a state
(although sometimes an international organization), intrudes upon author-
itative decision making within another state. Examples of violations of
Westphalian sovereignty include: IMF conditionality requirements, which
involve altering domestic policies, institutional arrangements, and some-
times even personnel;32 provisions for Catholic minority rights that were
included in the Dutch constitution at the insistence of the major powers at
the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars;33 equal civic and political rights for
all religious groups, that were accepted by the successor states of the Otto-
man Empire during the 19th century as a condition for recognition by the
major powers;34 economic sanctions against South Africa to end
apartheid;35 changes in civil military institutions in central European
states as a condition for membership in NATO. 3 6 Narrower definitions of
intervention, which emphasize the right to use legitimate force within a
state's boundaries or which regard any voluntary action as acceptable,
would not regard any of these situations as violations of the rule of non-
intervention.
The claim by one state that it had the right to use force to change or
protect the nature of the government in another would be a violation of
Westphalian sovereignty under any definition of intervention. Such claims
were made by the Holy Alliance after the Napoleonic Wars,3 7 by the United
States in Central America and the Caribbean during the first two decades
of the twentieth century,38 and by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe dur-
ing the Cold War.
39
Westphalian sovereignty is a basic ontological assumption for most
political scientists working in the area of international politics. The two
theoretical approaches that have dominated the study of the international
system by American political scientists since the 1960s are neo-realism and
32. SIDNEY DELL, ON BEING GRANDMOTHERLY: THE EVOLUTION OF IMF CONDITIONALITY
(1981) (International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University,
Essays in International Finance, No. 144).
33. J.A. LAPONCE, THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 39 (1960).
34. Stephen D. Krasner & Daniel Froats, The Westphalian Model and Minority-Rights
Guarantees In Europe, in THE INTERNATIONAL SPREAD OF CIVIL CONFLICT (David Lake &
Donald Rothschild eds., 1998).
35. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 35-36 (Milton J. Esman &
Shibley Telhami eds., 1995).
36. NATO, PARTNERSHIP WITH THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, June
7, 1991, art. 9; NATO, STUDY ON NATO ENLARGEMENT, Sept. 1995, chap. 5B, para. 72
37. Stanley Hoffmann, The Problem of Intervention, in INTERVENION IN WORLD POLI-
TICS 12 (Bull Hedley ed., 1984).
38. DANA GARDNER MUNRO, INTERVENTION AND DOLLAR DILOMACY IN THE CARIBBEAN,
1900-1921 (1964).
39. BRZEZINSKI, supra note 2; H. GORDON SKILLING, THE GOVERNMENTS OF COMMUNIST
EAST EUROPE (1966).
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neo-liberal insiitutionalism.40 Both assume that states are unified,
rational, autonomous, actors. These neo-realist or neo-liberal states are
constrained by the external environment. Within these external con-
straints, however, they (or their rulers) are free to choose the course of
action that will maximize their utility.4 1 Neo-realism emphasizes the
importance of power and the dangers inherent in an international system
that always poses the threat of violent death.42 Neo-liberal institutionalism
is more concerned with analyzing how states resolve market failure
problems, situations in which each individual state acting rationally in its
own self-interest creates an outcome that is Pareto sub-optimal. 43 Both
neo-realism and neo-liberalism, however, assume that states are free of
external authority.44 A poor, weak state might have little room for maneu-
ver, but its decisions would reflect its own preferences.
II. The Contradictions of Sovereignty
The three kinds of sovereignty-international legal, domestic (including
both control and authority structures), and Westphalian-are often treated
as if they were a coherent package. States are understood as entities with
established and internationally recognized authority structures, enjoying
stable and effective control within and across their borders, while free of
external intervention. Both logically and behaviorally, this conception of
sovereignty, sovereignty as an integral package of mutually consistent prin-
ciples and norms, is wrong.
The existence, or lack thereof, of one kind of sovereignty does not
imply the absence or presence of others. Domestic sovereignty can be
deeply eroded without any necessary impact on international legal sover-
eignty or Westphalian sovereignty. Many failed African states, for example,
have little control over policies or behavior within or across their borders.
Their domestic institutional structures are fragile at best, comprised some-
times of no more than the head of state, a few cronies, and a presidential
guard. Taxes are not collected; roads are not maintained; schools do not
operate; and civil servants are not paid. Nevertheless, such states maintain
their international legal sovereignty. Their representatives sit at the United
Nations. Their ambassadors enjoy diplomatic immunity. They are parties
to international agreements and members of international organizations.
Nor is their Westphalian sovereignty necessarily compromised. Weak
domestic sovereignty makes a state vulnerable to external intervention, but
40. For the most important exposition of neo-realism, see KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY
OF INTERNATIONAL PoLiTIcs (1979). For the most important exposition of neo-liberal
institutionalism, see ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, APTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DiscoRD IN
THE WORLD POLInCAL ECONOMY (1984).
41. See generally, e.g., NEOREALISM AND NEOUBERALISM: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE
(David Baldwin ed., 1993).
42. See generally WALTZ, supra note 40.
43. KEoHANE, supra note 40, at chap. 6; Arthur Stein, Coordination and Collaboration,
in NEOREALiSM AND NEOLIBERALISM: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE (David Baldwin ed.
1993).
44. See generally WALTZ, supra note 40.
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such intervention will only occur if other actors, especially other states,
have an interest in doing so. Many failed states are inconsequential. Their
collapse does not affect the interests of more powerful actors in the intema-
tional environment. Such actors could intervene, could violate the norms
of Westphalian sovereignty, but they have no interest in doing so. Hence,
failed states have international legal sovereignty but not domestic sover-
eignty, and they might, or might not, have Westphalian sovereignty.
In contrast, some states may have stable and well institutionalized
domestic authority structures, one element of domestic sovereignty and
international legal sovereignty, but not have Westphalian sovereignty. This
is the situation that characterizes all of the states of Western Europe.
These states are members of either or both the European Union and the
European Convention on Human Rights. The European Union has a set of
supra-national institutions, including the European Court of Justice (ECJ),
the European Parliament, and the European Commission, which can make
authoritative decisions about some aspects of policies within member
states. The members states of the Union have accepted the principles of
supremacy and direct effect with regard to the rulings of the ECJ. The rul-
ings of the European Court take precedence over the rulings of national
courts and the ruling of the ECJ are directly applicable in national judicial
systems. The European Parliament and Commission have significant
authority over the implementation of the single market.45
Similarly, the signatories to the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 46 have also established
a set of supra-national authority structures, the European Commission on
Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, that compromise
the Westphalian sovereignty of the member states. The Commission,
which is composed of experts who act in their individual capacity, can
receive complaints from individuals, non-governmental organizations, and
member states and can refer questions to the European Court of Human
Rights whose decisions are binding on states.4 7 Between 1953 and 1990
the Commission received 15,457 petitions, almost all from individuals.
From this total, 14,636 were declared inadmissible, 96 resulted in friendly
settlements, 430 led to a Commission report, and 251 led to judgments by
the Court.48 Decisions of the Commission and the Court have led to
changes in detention practices in Belgium and Germany, alien law in Swit-
45. For a discussion of the European Court ofJustice, see Ann-Marie Burley & Wal-
ter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT'L ORG.
41 (1993). For an explication of the four decision-making structures affecting different
issues in the European Union, see Geoffrey Garrett & George Tsebelis, An Institutional
Critique of Intergovernmentalism, 50 INT'L ORG. 269 (1996).
46. November 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221.
47. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HuMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 214 (1989).
48. Andrew Moravcsik, Lessons from the European Human Rights Regime, in INTER-
AMERicAN DIALOGUE, ADVANCING DEMocRAcY AND HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: WHAT
ROLE OF THE OAS? 45-46 (1994).
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zerland, and trial procedures in Sweden. 49 Hence, all of the countries of
Western Europe are international legal sovereigns, but they do not have
Westphalian sovereignty.
Taiwan is an example of a state that has Westphalian and domestic
sovereignty but does not have international legal sovereignty. Taiwan is
recognized by only a limited number of small and generally inconsequen-
tial states.50 None of the major powers recognize Taiwan. 5' Taiwan is a
member of only a small number of international organizations.5 2 Never-
theless, Taiwan has domestic and Westphalian sovereignty. It has a stable
domestic government structure which has effective control over activities
within its own borders. External actors have not had much influence over
the domestic authority structures within Taiwan.
Taiwan is not a unique case. Until the 1970s, all of the major powers,
with the exception of the Soviet Union, refused to recognize the People's
Republic of China as the government of China.5 3 Instead, representatives
from Taiwan, a small island whose population was only a small fraction
that in China, held China's seat in the United Nations. After the Bolshevik
revolution, the major powers refused to recognize the new government.
5 4
International legal sovereignty has been granted to entities that have
not had domestic or Westphalian sovereignty. The dominions of the Brit-
ish Commonwealth have been treated as independent states even though
their juridical independence has been ambiguous, since the final court of
appeal in the Commonwealth remains the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council.5 5 Beyelo-Russia and the Ukraine were admitted to the United
Nations, even though they were part of the Soviet Union.56 India signed
the Treaty of Versailles and was a member of the League of Nations even
though it was a colony of Great Britain.57 Andorra was admitted to the
United Nations in 1993, even though authorities in France and Spain have
a veto over matters related to its security.58 The Order of Malta has been
recognized as a sovereign person by some sixty states even though it has
49. Id. at 35-58; DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HuMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PoLITIcs 52, 57, 59
(1983); JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 82-83 (1992); DAVID P. FORSYTHE,
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1992).
50. Kim, supra note 18, at 151.
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essentially no territory.5 9
III. Paradoxes and Contradictions
There is an inherent paradox in the juxtaposition of international legal sov-
ereignty and Westphalian sovereignty, and a fundamental contradiction
between the international environment whose defining feature is anarchy,
the absence of any authoritative global institutions, and the principle of
non-intervention. International legal sovereignty implies that states can do
anything they please as long as they are free of coercion. If states can enter
into any contractual arrangements they desire, they can choose to compro-
mise their Westphalian sovereignty. Indeed, almost all states have done
exactly that by entering into one or more international human rights
accords, all of which subject their domestic behavior to some degree of
international scrutiny.60 In many instances, signing on to such conven-
tions has had little impact on the actual behavior of states. Nevertheless,
such agreements can have unexpected consequences. The 1975 Helsinki
Final Act commitments to human rights were viewed by the communist
governments of Eastern Europe as empty phrases, but they helped to galva-
nize human rights groups in Poland, Czechoslovakia and other eastern bloc
countries. 6 1 In the case of the European Human Rights Convention, the
leaders of postwar Europe knew very well that they wanted to establish an
international regime that might contribute to the consolidation of democ-
racy in Europe, a development that was not a foregone conclusion in the
wake of the second World War.62 There is nothing problematic for interna-
tional legal sovereignty with signing any one of the twenty-plus United
Nations human rights conventions, the Helsinki Accords, or the European
Human Rights Convention. Nevertheless, all of these agreements violated
Westphalian sovereignty by subjecting the domestic authority structures of
the signatory states to external influence.
Sovereign lending, especially to weak states, has also been character-
ized by the paradoxical relationship between international legal sover-
eignty and Westphalian sovereignty. Early modern European sovereigns,
monarchs, were very dependent on international bankers. Interest rates
were high because, if the king defaulted, the banker was not in a position to
sue.6 3 These arrangements were perfectly consistent with Westphalian sov-
ereignty; there was no effort by lenders to influence the domestic authority
59. HJ.A. SIRE, THE KNIGHTS o: MALTA 237-42, 249-50, 271 (1994); OPPENHEIM, supra
note 13, at 329.
60. For the texts of the major human rights agreements, see generally IAN BROWNLIE,
BASIC DocUMENTs ON HuMAN RIGHTS (3d ed. 1992).
61. Daniel Thomas, Social Movements and International Institutions: A Preliminary
Framework, Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Con-
vention, Washington, D.C. (1990) (on file with the Cornell International Law Journal).
62. Moravcsik, supra note 48, at 44.
63. Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The
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structures of borrowers. During the 19th century, and especially since the
1950s, sovereign lending to developing states has been governed by norms
that are inconsistent with Westphalian sovereignty. International financial
institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund, attach conditionality requirements to their loans. Conditionality,
rejected at the 1944 Bretton Woods meetings where the Articles of Agree-
ment of the Fund and the Bank were drafted, has become the norm.6 4 Con-
ditionality requirements, first attached to strictly economic policies, have
become more and more expansive. They now include not just specific
practices, such as quantitative import restrictions, but issues associated
with institutional structures and personnel as well. At their annual meet-
ing in 1996, for example, the president of the World Bank and the manag-
ing director of the International Monetary Fund committed themselves to a
more aggressive attack on corruption in the Third World.65 The IMF with-
held loans to Kenya when its leaders failed to create an anti-corruption
agency and dismissed a high ranking official who had been battling against
government dishonesty. 66 The World Bank has organized programs to
help countries, including Latvia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ukraine, limit
internal corruption. 67 The Bank official coordinating these new policies
stated that, "You will see us giving a much higher profile to governance and
corruption concerns in a selective way, delaying disbursements until we are
satisfied, or suspending it altogether." 68 The World Bank's 1997 World
Development Report, subtitled The State in a Changing World, argues among
other things that the "clamor for greater government effectiveness has
reached crisis proportions in many developing countries where the state
has failed to deliver even such fundamental public goods as property
rights, roads, and basic health and education."69 The Report continued,
describing the situation in Sub-Saharan Africa as one in which there is an
urgent priority to "rebuild state effectiveness through an overhaul of public
institutions, reasserting the rule of law, and credible checks on abuse of
state power."
70
Human rights conventions and sovereign lending by international
financial institutions are examples of interactions in which international
legal sovereignty is the basis for compromising Westphalian sovereignty. It
is only because states are recognized as sovereigns that they can compro-
mise their sovereignty; or, less obscurely, only recognized states can enter
into agreements that might challenge their exclusive authority within their
own territory. More generally, states have frequently entered into interna-
tional agreements that have compromised their own domestic autonomy
64. DELL, supra note 32, at 4.
65. Paul Lewis, Two Global Lenders Use Leverage to Combat Corruption, N.Y. TIMs,
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because they have confronted problems that they could not solve unilater-
ally. The European Union is only the most extreme example. Various
environmental agreements and some trade arrangements, especially those
with more legalized dispute settlement mechanisms such as NAFTA and
the WTO, are examples of arrangements in which international legal sover-
eigns enter into agreements that undermine their Westphalian sovereignty.
These arrangements have never posed any problem for the interna-
tional legal perspective on sovereignty. For international legal scholars, the
defining attributes of sovereignty are recognition and the absence of coer-
cion. Compromises of Westphalian sovereignty, even voluntary com-
promises, are more problematic for political scientists who have assumed
not only that states are the basic actors in the international system but also
that these states are autonomous, free to choose their own policies and
institutional arrangements, subject only to constraints imposed by the
power of other states and not by the ability of other states or international
organizations to penetrate the domestic political structures of their coun-
terparts. There is, therefore, a paradox between international legal sover-
eignty and Westphalian sovereignty. The presence of the former implies
that the latter can be compromised.
The fact that the international environment is anarchical poses a logi-
cal contradiction for Westphalian sovereignty. There is no higher authority
to judge the actions of states. In the final analysis, states can do anything
that they want; or, more accurately, rulers can choose any policy subject
only to the constraints imposed by other states and their own domestic
constituents. But if states can choose any policy, then intervention in the
internal affairs of other states is always an available option. If autonomy,
Westphalian sovereignty, is compromised coercively, such actions would
be inconsistent with both international legal sovereignty and Westphalian
sovereignty. Nevertheless, there is no reason to expect that such coercive
interventions would not take place.
The beginnings of the Cold War in Europe offer an example of coer-
cive activity to alter domestic political structures. The Soviet Union was
much more heavily engaged in such activity, but the United States also
considered the use of force.
Europe was the focus of the political struggle between the Soviet
Union and the United States. These two states dominated the military situ-
ation. Their domestic political and economic structures were informed by
radically different political ideologies. The rulers in both countries were
determined to reproduce their preferred political structures in those states
in Europe that fell within their sphere of influence. The Westphalian
model was hardly worth a nod. In Western Europe, the United States oper-
ated largely through contractual arrangements with sympathetic leaders,
although in Germany its position as an occupying power provided it with
opportunities for coercive leverage as well. 7 1 In Eastern Europe, the Soviet
71. MANFRED JONAS, THE UNITED STATES AND GEm,: A DIPLOMAInc HISTORY 286-
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Union pursued a more complicated strategy, first using imposition to
establish and maintain communist regimes, but later engaging in contrac-
tual relationships with communist rulers in the satellite states who, never-
theless, remained dependent on the Soviet army for the basic survival of
their regimes.
72
After World War II, the basic constitutional structures, policies, and
personnel of the Eastern European states, with the exception of Yugoslavia
and Albania, were determined by the Soviet Union. In the most extreme
cases, areas (parts of Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Romania) and
whole countries (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania) were simply absorbed into the
Soviet Union. In the rest of Eastern Europe, Stalin imposed communist
regimes.7 3 Soviet rulers were motivated by both concerns about national
security and the authority of Marxism- Leninism. 74 In both World Wars I
and II, and the Napoleonic wars as well, Russia had been invaded from the
west. The smaller states of Central Europe provided a buffer. These states
could, however, only be reliable security allies if they were dominated by
communist regimes. Absent control over their domestic regimes, the stra-
tegic logic for the Central European states would have been to balance
against the Soviet Union provided that they could find an ally in the West.
The relationship between the control of Eastern Europe and Soviet
security faded, even disappeared, with the development of secure second
strike capability. By the 1970s, the territorial and political integrity of the
Soviet Union depended upon hardened missile sites and nuclear subma-
rines. Still, Soviet leaders persisted in maintaining control of Eastern Euro-
pean regimes until the Soviet Empire, and the Soviet Union, collapsed.
Once communist regimes had been established in Eastern Europe, their
failure would have jeopardized, and indeed did jeopardize, the stability of
the Soviet Union itself.7 5 Soviet rule was legitimated by Marxism-Lenin-
ism, a teleological ideology claimed by its adherents to provide a scientific
understanding of human society, especially the inevitable evolution from
capitalism to socialism to communism. 76 A reversal of this process, the
transformation from socialism to capitalism suggested that Marxism-Len-
inism was wrong, a prospect that affected not just the legitimacy of the
regimes of Eastern Europe, but that of the Soviet Union as well. Hence,
once communist regimes were established, the rulers of the Soviet Union
could not let them revert to some other institutional form without jeopard-
izing their own position.
With the outbreak of the Cold War in 1947, Stalin consolidated com-
munist control in Eastern Europe by creating institutional structures and
policies that mimicked those of the Soviet Union. The satellite states
72. David Lake, Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations, 50
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adopted new constitutions in the period 1947-1952, which were modeled
on that of the Soviet Union.77 The supremacy of the Party was underlined;
in every factory, enterprise, town and village the party committee was the
source of authority for all issues. Stalin emphasized the intensification of
the class struggle to unmask class enemies, and the use of terror became
pervasive in Eastern Europe, including secret trials, forced labor, deporta-
tions from major cities, and Party purges after 1949.78 Taxes on peasants
were increased and the collectivization of agriculture intensified, although
with uneven results. 79 Over ninety percent of the land was collectivized in
Bulgaria, but only about fifteen percent in Poland.80 The educational sys-
tem was changed to become closer to that of the Soviet Union. Industry
was nationalized and resources were focused on heavy industry. All of the
communist states adopted multi-year development plans based on the
Soviet model. Stalin imposed uniformity on the satellite states where he
could, Yugoslavia being the obvious exception.81 The Soviet Union had a
sphere of influence that made it possible to engage in coercion and imposi-
tion to alter the basic constitutional structures of the satellite states.82
The Soviets did not just establish the communist regimes of Eastern
Europe, they also penetrated these polities on an ongoing basis. Bilateral
consultations with the Soviet leadership were obligatory. Even after the
death of Stalin, Soviet leaders insisted on the right to decide who would
head the government in the satellite states. Close relations were main-
tained between the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU) apparat and the party apparats in Eastern Europe. Fre-
quently, appointments to major Party positions in Eastern Europe were
only given to those individuals with extensive experience in Moscow.83
Soviet penetration of the domestic polities of the satellite states was
extensive with regard to the secret police and the military. The Soviets
often directly controlled the internal security apparatuses of the Eastern
European states. The Soviet secret police maintained their own autono-
mous operations in Eastern Europe and were empowered to arrest nation-
als of these states.84 The Soviets organized the Polish secret police. The
head of the Polish Security Ministry had Soviet officers as his personal
guards and was advised by an official of the Soviet Ministry of State Secur-
ity. At one point, eight out of twenty sections in the Polish Ministry of
Internal Security were headed by Soviet officers. 85 The Inspectorate of
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78. Id. at 90-94.
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Party Cadres in the Bulgarian Central Committee was staffed with former
members of the Soviet secret police.8 6 Similar levels of penetration
occurred in other countries. In the later 1940s, the secret policy in the
satellite states were subject to orders directly from Moscow.
8 7
Most critically, the Soviets tightly regulated the militaries of the satel-
lite states. Initially, the Soviet Union discouraged armies in Eastern
Europe, but, after 1948, the armed forces of the satellites were built up.88
The question of loyalty became critical. Marshal Rokossovsky, a Soviet
officer was appointed as head of the Polish ministry of defense in 1949.89
Initially, Soviet officers commanded all of the branches of the Polish armed
forces. There were about 17,000 Soviet officers with command positions in
the Polish army in the late 1940s.90 In other countries, Soviet officers
acted as advisors not only to the central command but at the regimental
level as well. Soviet practices were adopted.9 1 Only in Czechoslovakia,
where local party officials were well organized, was Soviet direct penetra-
tion of the military more limited.
92
After Stalin's death, the level of direct Soviet penetration, such as
through the appointment of officers, declined, but the Eastern Bloc militar-
ies were organized in such a way to make, it very difficult for them to func-
tion independent of Soviet forces. The Warsaw Treaty Organization
(WTO) was established in 1955. 93 The military doctrines of the Warsaw
Pact emphasized the importance of joint military operations among Social-
ist states.94 In 1961, Marshall Grechko, then the leading military official of
the Warsaw Treaty Organization, introduced a system of joint military exer-
cises that precluded the development of autonomous defense strategies by
the members of the Pact.9 5 In addition, the chief of staff of the Pact was the
head of the directorate of the Soviet General Staff.9 6 The leaders of the
Eastern European militaries were educated at the leading Soviet military
academy where promising individuals could be identified making it easier
for Moscow to promote their subsequent careers.
97
In sum, relations among the states of Eastern Europe during the Cold
War were incomprehensible from the perspective of the Westphalian
model. The Brezhnev Doctrine, articulated by Brezhnev after the repres-
sion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, stated that a communist country had the
right of self-determination only to the extent that the interests of the Soviet
86. Id. at 119-20.
87. Id. at 90-94, 119-21.
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commonwealth were not jeopardized. "Each of our parties," Brezhnev
stated, "is responsible not only to its working class and its people, but also
to the international working class, the world communist movement."98
The Soviet Union asserted its right to intervene in any communist state to
prevent the success of "counter-revolutionary" elements.99
The Soviet Union could act with impunity in Eastern Europe during
the Cold War because it was not challenged by other major powers, notably
the United States. The Americans accepted a Soviet sphere of influence.
There was nothing to prevent Stalin and his successors from imposing their
preferred domestic structures on the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe.
Lest such practices be associated only with autocratic regimes, it
should be recognized that the United States has acted in similar ways with
regard to Central America and the Caribbean, areas where the United
States had a sphere of influence. By 1900, no other power could challenge
its initiatives or offer assistance to rulers who were subject to U.S. pressure.
American officials became involved in the domestic affairs of a number of
smaller neighboring states, often with regard to issues of sovereign lending,
but also with respect to basic institutional structures. 100
In the 1904 State of the Union Message, President Theodore Roosevelt
articulated what came to be known as the Roosevelt Corollary. He said:
Chronic wrong-doing or an impotence which results in a general loosening
of the ties of civilized society, may in America as elsewhere ultimately
require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemi-
sphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force
the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing
or impotence to the exercise of an international police power. 1°1
The parallels with the Brezhnev Doctrine are obvious. Thus, the Westpha-
lian model did not guide American relations with its small southern neigh-
bors in the first part of the 20th century.
Cuba became independent with the help of the American military.10 2
Spain was decisively defeated in 1898 and driven out of the Western hemi-
sphere as well as the Philippines.' 0 3 In 1901, the Platt Amendment,
attached to the Military Appropriations Act, stipulated the conditions
under which the U.S. military would withdraw from Cuba, including a pro-
hibition on Cuban transfer of land to any power other than the United
States, limitations on Cuba's treaty making power, the grant of a naval base
at Guantanamo Bay, and the right of the United States to intervene to pre-
serve Cuban independence. 10 4 Cuba reluctantly incorporated the terms of
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the Platt Amendment into its constitution. The Amendment was also part
of a formal treaty between the United States and Cuba which was signed in
May 1903 and ratified by both governments in 1904.105
In 1906, following a period of civil strife, the leaders of Cuba precipi-
tated American military action by resigning from office. William Howard
Taft, who had headed an American mission of inquiry in 1905, became the
provisional governor and was succeeded by another American. Troops
were sent again in 1912 when internal disorder threatened American eco-
nomic interests. 10 6 The would-be rulers of Cuba had to accept American
conditions to get American troops off the island. They did not have
enough power to resist. The alternative to accepting the Platt Amendment
was non-existence.
Cuba was not the only Caribbean state to experience American impo-
sition. The United States established a customs receivership in the Domin-
ican Republic in 1905 after the German, Italian, and Spanish governments
threatened to intervene to protect their creditors. 10 7 In 1911, the United
States sent 750 Marines into the Dominican Republic to stifle civil disorder
and forced the resignation of the president by threatening to cut off the
short-term loans on which the government depended.' 0 8 The United States
occupied the Dominican Republic again in 1916 after a surge of political
unrest, and declared martial law. The American commanding officer
appointed U.S. officials as ministers of War and Marine and of the Interior,
and as commanding officers of the national guard. Elections were sus-
pended in 1917 and the press was censored. The U.S. occupiers also reor-
ganized and expanded the educational system. 10 9
American troops landed in Haiti eight times between 1867 and 1900.
As a result of pressure from the United States, American banks were
included in the scheme for customs receivership that was established for
Haiti in 1909-10.110 In 1915, in the midst of civil disorder, American rul-
ers again sent in troops and also chose the new president. From 1915 to
1929 U.S. military tribunals made rulings on political cases. A treaty that
provided for American control of customs and construction of roads, as
well as supervision of schools and the constabulary, was approved by the
Haitian legislature under threat that American troops would remain in the
country. American officials wrote a new constitution and dissolved the
Haitian legislature when it refused to approve it. The U.S. occupying force
supervised the referendum which approved the new document. In 1919,
the Marines killed more than 3,000 Haitian who were fighting against
American rule."'
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Central America was also a target of American intervention. The area
was fraught with both domestic and international conflicts. American rul-
ers wanted to control any trans-isthmusian canal and were anxious about
European threats to American economic interests, largely in agriculture
and railways. 1 12 The United States supported rebel groups in Panama after
the government of Colombia rejected its proposals for American control
over a zone around the proposed canal. 113 In Honduras in 1911, the
United States forced out the president and chose his successor. 114 In
1910, the United States intervened in the Nicaraguan civil war. A hundred
Marines remained in the country until 1925, a tangible demonstration of
the American commitment to the government. In 1916 U.S. officials effec-
tively selected the president, Chamorro, after securing the Bryan Chamorro
Treaty (1914) which gave the United States control over any canal that
might be constructed in that country.
115
With the Good Neighbor policy of the 1930s, American intervention
in Central America and the Caribbean became more constrained. Never-
theless, the United States has never simply allowed its small neighboring
countries to go their own way. American leaders supported the Bay of Pigs
invasion designed to bring down the newly established communist govern-
ment in Cuba and, when this effort failed, considered plans to assassinate
Castro. 116 The Reagan administration provided support for the Contra
rebels in Nicaragua and invaded Grenada to overthrow its communist
regime. 117 In 1989, American troops invaded Panama, arrested its head of
state, Manuel Noriega, and brought him to Florida where he was tried and
jailed on drug charges. 1 8 In 1994, under the auspices of the United
Nations, American forces occupied Haiti. 119
In sum, major powers, once having established effective spheres of
influence, have not hesitated to intervene in the internal affairs of weaker
states. In an anarchical environment, there is no authoritative actor capa-
ble of preventing such actions. The states that have been the target of such
actions are semi-sovereigns, if that term is understood to apply to an entity
that may have international legal sovereignty but does not have effective
control over its own domestic affairs including its basic structures of
authority.
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IV. Semi-Sovereignty and the Balkans
The tragic developments that have taken place in the former Yugoslavia
during the 1990s galvanized the international community. One major
focus of these efforts has been to guarantee minority rights. These guaran-
tees have inevitably involved compromises of Westphalian sovereignty.
These compromises have usually been achieved through coercive meas-
ures, including the use of force. The human rights provisions of the Day-
ton Accord and the conditions attached to recognition by the European
Union in 1991 are only the most recent additions to a book whose opening
chapters include the founding moments of all of the states of the Balkans.
From Greece in 1832 to Bosnia in 1995, every single state that has been
established in the Balkans has experienced external intervention by the
major ppwers designed to secure rights for minority groups, first religious
and then ethnic.
Greece was the first Balkan state to secure its independence from the
Ottoman Empire. The Greek civil war was a success only because of the
intervention of the major European powers, most importantly at the Battle
of Navarino in 1827 when a combined British, Russian, and French fleet
sunk the Egyptian navy, the Ottoman's most formidable seagoing force.120
The major powers were involved primarily because of their mutual distrust.
Russia wanted greater influence in the area and possibly direct access to
the Mediterranean. Britain wanted to prevent Russian initiatives. The
monarchical regime that emerged after a decade of war in Greece, the fiscal
arrangements for the new state, the provisions for the protection of minori-
ties, and the individuals who occupied major positions, including the
crown, were all imposed by the major European powers.' 21
In February 1830, Britain, France, and Russia signed three protocols
in London regarding Greece. The protocols established that Greece would
be a monarchy, a decision that ignored the constitutional choices of the
provisional Greek governments during the 1820s. 122 The major powers
first designated Leopold of Saxe Coburg as king, and when he prudently
turned down this offer to become King of Belgium, they designated Otto,
the underage second son of the King of Bavaria. The Greek leaders
accepted these accords because they had little choice. France, England,
and Russia were to act as guarantors of the settlement.123
The arrangements for Greece also included provisions for religious tol-
eration. In some ways, this policy was only a continuation of efforts by
Russia and France, in particular, to protect the rights of Christians within
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the Ottoman Empire, efforts that extended back to the time of the Cru-
sades.124 The 1830 protocol stated that to preserve Greece from "the
calamities which the rivalries of the religions therein professed might
excite," it must "agree that all the subjects of the new State, whatever their
religion may be, shall be admissible to all public employments, functions
and honours, and be treated on a footing of perfect equality, without
regard to difference of creed, in their relations, religious, civil or polit-
ical."125 The major powers wanted religious toleration because they were
concerned about unrest in the Balkans into which they might be drawn.
1 2 6
After the Crimean War, the major powers also insisted on religious
toleration in Wallachia and Moldavia, the two Ottoman provinces that were
to become Romania. When Moldavia and Wallachia secured their indepen-
dence in 1856, the Western powers sought to guarantee equal treatment for
all, including Jews. The Treaty of Paris of 1858 implied that civil liberty
and religious toleration should be granted to Jews, but the Romanian
authorities ignored these vaguely worded provisions. 127 During the late
1860s, leaders in both Britain and France protested against the treatment
of Jews in Romania. In Britain, Lord Stanley argued that the treatment of
Jews in Romania was an affair that touched Christians as well as Jews,
because, "if the suffering falls on the Jews, the shame falls on the Chris-
tians."128 Romania rejected foreign protestations, arguing that the princi-
ple of non-intervention ought to be upheld. The British claimed that the
Treaty of Paris of 1858 gave the powers the right to enforce Article 46
which provided for political and economic equality for Jews.
129
The efforts of the major powers to establish religious toleration in the
Balkans reached their apogee at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The Con-
gress was organized to settle the first Balkan Wars. It culminated with the
recognition of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro as independent states,
and Bulgaria as a tributary state of the Ottoman Empire. As a condition of
international recognition, the major powers insisted that the new states
accept minority rights, more precisely, religious equality. For example,
Article XXVII of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 stated that:
In Montenegro the difference of religious creeds and confessions shall not
be alleged against any person as a ground for exclusion or incapacity in
matters relating to the enjoyment of civil and political rights, admission to
public employments, functions, and honours, or the exercise of the various
professions and industries in any locality whatsoever. The freedom and out-
ward exercise of all forms of worship shall be assured to all persons belong-
ing to Montenegro, as well as to foreigners, and no hindrance shall be
offered either to the hierarchical organization of the different communions,
124. CARLILE AYLMER MACARTNEY, NATIONAL STATES AND NATIONAL MINORITIES 161-63
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or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs.1 30
Identical provisions were provided for Romania (Article XLIV), Bulgaria
(Article V), and Serbia' (Article XXXV).
131
The major powers applied provisions for religious toleration primarily
because they were concerned with international stability. The Balkans
were a volatile area. Orthodox religious concerns had provided a pretext
for Russian intervention, and Russian intervention in the Balkans and the
Ottoman Empire threatened British interests in the eastern Mediterra-
nean.132 Austria-Hungary was fearful of ethnic nationalism, prompting
informal control of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878 and formal incorpora-
tion in 1907. Bismarck was anxious to maintain Germany's alliance with
both Austria-Hungary and Russia, which was ultimately undermined by
conflict in the Balkans.
133
In addition, there were what would now be labeled humanitarian con-
cerns and interest group pressure. British public opinion had been agi-
tated by reports of Turkish atrocities against the Bulgarians; Gladstone's
popularization of this issue had helped to return him to the position of
prime minister.1 34 Jewish groups in the United States and Great Britain
pressured their governments to pay attention to Romanian treatment of
their co-religionists.135 Later in the century, when it became evident that
the situation for Jews in Romania was not much improved, American offi-
cials pressed Romania for reforms with the hope of limiting the flow of new
emigrants.'
36
The efforts to secure minority rights in the Balkans in the 19th century
failed. The treatment of Jews in Romania was particularly problematic.
Articles 43 and 44 of the Treaty of Berlin conditioned international legal
recognition on acceptance of religious equality and recognition was only
extended in February 1880 after Romanian officials had publicly declared
that ajew could become a citizen.' 37 In practice, however, Romanian pol-
icy hardly changed. While the letter of the Treaty was honored by making
it possible for a non-Christian to obtain citizenship, this required an act of
parliament for each individual. Of the 269,000 Jews in Romania, only 200
attained citizenship. 138 Non-citizens had to pay for primary school and
were excluded from professional schools in 1893, and secondary and
higher education in 1898.139 Jews were also prohibited from living in
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rural areas. 140 By the beginning of the 20th century, almost 90% of
Romanian emigres to the United States were Jewish.
14 1
International efforts to secure minority rights culminated at the Ver-
sailles meetings that settled World War I. All of the new states that were
created, or the polities that had their boundaries re-drawn signed agree-
ments or made unilateral pledges regarding the protection of religious and
ethnic minorities within their own boundaries. All of the Balkan states
were part of this process.' 42 In most cases, these actions were the result of
coercion or imposition, but, in a few instances, rulers in the new states
welcomed international agreements on minority rights, either because they
were committed to such values or because they believed that international
accords would either ease their domestic minority problems or improve the
condition of their co-ethnics living in other states.14 3 Unlike the Berlin
settlement, the Versailles arrangements provided for elaborate monitoring
and enforcement through the League of Nations and the Permanent Inter-
national Court of Justice. 144 Like the Berlin settlements, those concluded
at Versailles also failed.
The minority rights established after World War I were set in peace
treaties signed with Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria,
and Romania in 1919,145 with Hungary and Greece in 1920,146 and with
Turkey in 1923; 14 7 in declarations made as a condition for admission to
the League for Albania in 1921,148 Lithuania in 1922,149 Latvia and Esto-
nia in 1923,150 and Iraq in 1932.'51 There were also provisions for the
treatment of minorities in the 1920 Convention between Poland and the
Free City of Danzig,' 5 2 in the 1921 Convention on the Aaland Islands,'
5 3
in the 1922 Convention between Germany and Poland Relating to Upper
Silesia, 154 and in the 1924 Paris Convention Concerning the Territory of
Memel. 15 5 The stipulated rights were often highly detailed, including, for
instance, provisions for bilingual education in areas with high minority
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populations. 15 6 In some cases, such as Bulgaria, minority rights were writ-
ten into the country's basic constitutional documents.' 57 National laws
related to minorities could not be changed without the approval of the
major powers in the League of Nations Council.
158
The major European powers legitimated their intervention in terms of
traditional European diplomacy. The major powers had the right, French
President Georges Clemenceau, argued, to condition their recognition on
the acceptance by new states of recognized principles of governance, such
as the acceptance of minority rights.' 5 9 Woodrow Wilson, championed a
second rationale for the international protection of minority rights. Wil-
son's vision of the new world order in 1918 was collective security: peace-
loving states would join together to resist attacks by any aggressor.
160
Only democratic states would make such commitments. 16 1 The first guar-
antee of democracy was self-determination. Self-determination alone, how-
ever, could not resolve political tensions because, in much of central
Europe, ethnic minorities were inextricably mingled with majority popula-
tions. The Versailles settlements left large minority populations in many
countries. 16 2 If minorities were ill-treated, they could not only cause disor-
der within their countries of residence, they could also threaten interna-
tional peace and undermine collective security. The treaties sought to
resolve this issue by providing minorities with security within existing
states.1 6 3 Wilson stated at the Paris Peace Conference that:
Nothing, I venture to say, is more likely, to disturb the peace of the world
than the treatment which might in certain circumstances be meted out to
minorities. And therefore, if the great powers are to guarantee the peace of
the world in any sense, is it unjust that they should be satisfied that the
proper and necessary guarantees have been given?
164
The League regime for the protection of minorities in the Balkans and
elsewhere was, like initiatives taken at Paris in 1856 and Berlin in 1878, a
dismal failure. With the exception of a small number of countries, includ-
ing Hungary which was confronted with a situation of large Hungarian
minorities in other countries but few minorities in Hungary itself, and
Czechoslovakia whose rulers felt that minority rights might help to recon-
cile the large German speaking minority in the Sudetenland to Czech rule,
the governments of Central Europe were unenthusiastic at best about
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minority protection. They argued that these initiatives constituted an
unfair intervention in their internal affairs. They pointed out the that the
Americans had not accepted minority protections for Asians or blacks liv-
ing in the United States, nor had Britain accepted protections for Irish and
Welsh living in the United Kingdom. 165 The League process was cumber-
some. The major powers were not willing to commit resources. Poland
renounced its minority rights arrangements in the mid 1930s. And noth-
ing could be a more disheartening reminder of the futility of interwar
efforts than the Holocaust.
166
After World War II, concern, in general, with minority rights issues
languished and was replaced by a focus on human rights.167 But with the
end of the Cold War and the renewal of ethnic conflict in parts of Africa
and the Balkans, minority rights again drew the attention of the interna-
tional community. Again in the Balkans, the major powers attempted to
assure stability by coercing local actors to accept protections for minori-
ties. When Yugoslavia disintegrated, the European Union made the accept-
ance of minority rights a condition of recognition for Macedonia, Croatia,
and Slovenia.' 68 As part of the 1995 Dayton Accord, new organizations, a
Human Rights Commission and a Human Rights Ombudsman, were cre-
ated for Bosnia. 169 All of these initiatives violated Westphalian sover-
eignty. They also raised questions for international legal sovereignty
because these arrangements were not ones that the target states would have
chosen on their own.
Minority rights were explicitly included in the conditions for Euro-
pean Community recognition of the republics that emerged from the for-
mer Yugoslavia. In December 1991, the foreign ministers of the European
Community made acceptance of the Carrington Plan, formally the Treaty
Provisions for the Convention (with the former republics of Yugoslavia),
the prerequisite for recognition.17° The republics were to protect the rights
of national and ethnic minorities elaborated in international conventions
adopted by the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Coop-
erations in Europe (CSCE), including the proposed United Nations Decla-
ration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious,
and Linguistic Minorities, and the Convention for the Protection of Minori-
ties of the European Commission.171 Members of minority groups were to
be given the right to participate in the "government of the Republics con-
165. CLAUDE, supra note 144, at 17, 32-34.
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cerning their affairs." 172 In local areas where members of a minority
formed a majority of the population, they were to be given special status,
including a national emblem, an educational system "which respects the
values and needs of that group,"173 a legislative body, a regional police
force, and a judiciary which reflects the composition of the population.174
Such special areas were to be permanently demilitarized unless they were
on an international border. The rights established in the convention were
to be assured through national legislation. 175 The republics were to agree
to a permanent international body that would monitor these special areas.
Disputes were to be taken to a newly established Court of Human Rights
which would consist of one member nominated by each of the Yugoslavian
republics, and an equal number plus one of nationals from European
states who would be nominated by the Member States of the European
Community.
176
In January of 1992, after the Community had recognized Croatia, Mac-
edonia, and Slovenia, the EC Arbitration Commission (Badinter Commis-
sion) ruled that Slovenia and Macedonia had met the conditions specified
in the Carrington Report.177 Croatia, after being pressured by the EC, also
promised that it would fulfill the conditions. In May of 1992, Croatia
passed the Constitutional Law of Human Rights and Freedoms and the
Rights of National and Ethnic Communities or Minorities in the Republic
of Croatia. 178 Many of the provisions of the law repeat word for word the
text of the Carrington Report. For example, special status districts were
designated where minorities were to be educated in their own language,
using a curriculum adequate to "present their history, culture and science
if such a wish is expressed." 179 Representatives from minorities totaling
more than eight percent of the population of the whole country were enti-
tled to proportional representation in the Croatian Parliament, govern-
ment, and supreme judicial bodies. 180 Those with less than eight percent
were entitled to elect five representatives to the House of Representatives of
the Croatian Parliament.' 8 Issues regarding minority and human rights
were to be decided by the Court of Human Rights which would be estab-
lished by all of the states created out of the territory of the former Yugosla-
via.182 In the interim, a provisional Court of Human Rights was
established with the President and two members to be nominated by the
EC from citizens of its Members States, and the other two members
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selected by Croatia.183 As developments in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia
demonstrated in the early 1990s, these provisions for the protection of
minorities in the new states of the former Yugoslavia were not a complete
success.
This issue was revisited at Dayton in December of 1995 where, to
secure an end to the fighting in Bosnia, the United States brought the lead-
ers of the warring factions to a military base in Ohio and kept them there,
in relative isolation not only from the rest of the world but from each other,
until an agreement was hammered out. Annex 6 of the Dayton Accords
related to human rights and committed the signatories-the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
the Republika Srpska-to honor the provisions of fifteen international and
European human rights accords. 184 It provided for the creation of an
Ombudsman for human rights who would have diplomatic immunity,
would not be a citizen of any parts of the former Yugoslavia, and would
initially be appointed to a five year term by the Organization for Coopera-
tion and Security in Europe (OCSE).185 It also provided for a fourteen-
member Chamber of Human Rights, four of whose members would be
appointed by Bosnia and Herzegovina, two by the Republic of Srpska, and
the other eight, none of whom would be citizens of the states that had been
part of Yugoslavia, by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe.18 6 Individuals could bring complaints to the Chamber, whose
decisions, taken by a majority vote, would be binding on the signato-
ries.187 Non-governmental organizations and international organizations
were to be invited to Bosnia to monitor the implementation of the terms of
the Annex.' 88 After five years the Chamber and the office of the
Ombudsman would pass to the control of Bosnia and Herzegovina if all of
the parties agreed.18 9
There is little evidence that these most recent initiatives to deal with
minority issues in the Balkans will be any more successful than earlier ini-
tiatives. The arrangements made at Paris in 1856 and Berlin in 1878 did
not lead to stable multi-ethnic societies. Nor did the minority rights regime
established after the first world war. The Dayton accords seem destined to
suffer the same fate.
Conclusion
The term sovereignty has been used in several different ways, notably
domestic sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, and international legal sov-
ereignty. The different kinds of sovereignty are not mutually reinforcing.
International legal sovereignty has often been the necessary condition for
183. Id. art. 60; CRAwFoRD, supra note 22, at 497.
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compromising Westphalian sovereignty-states have entered into many
international agreements that compromise their domestic autonomy. The
loss of domestic sovereignty, domestic control, rarely leads to a loss of
international recognition. The existence of effective domestic authority
does not guarantee that a state will be accorded international legal sover-
eignty. Moreover, because the international system is anarchical, there is
no authority structure that can prevent one state from forcibly intervening
in the internal affairs of another, in violation of both Westphalian and
international legal sovereignty.
The assumption that the international system is composed of
independent, autonomous, recognized, effective states is a wonderfully
simplifying assumption for both legal reasoning and social science analy-
sis. In many instances, this assumption has provided a deeper understand-
ing of interactions in the international environment. But for many other
problems, especially issues related to minority and human rights, it has
blinded observers to the multiple ways in which sovereignty has actually
been manifest. There have been states with domestic sovereignty but not
international legal sovereignty, with international legal sovereignty but not
Westphalian sovereignty, and with Westphalian sovereignty but not domes-
tic sovereignty.
States that have possessed all of the attributes of sovereignty have not
been commonplace. Perhaps the United States is the only example of a
state that has been sovereign in all senses, except during the period of the
Civil War. No state that has existed in the Balkans, from Greek indepen-
dence in 1832 to the present, could be characterized as having all of the
attributes of sovereignty, with the possible exception of Yugoslavia and
Albania for parts of the post-World War II period. No member state of the
European Union is a Westphalian sovereign, nor was any satellite state of
the Soviet Union during the Cold War, nor is any signatory of a stand-by
agreement with an international financial institution.
Some violations of concepts of sovereignty have been stable; others
have not. The only compromises of Westphalian sovereignty that have
proven to be stable are ones that have been achieved through voluntary
contracts among states. Coercion has not worked. The European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and the International Monetary Fund have been
effective organizational arrangements because the states that have partici-
pated in them regard themselves as being better off with these agreements
than without. These arrangements are self enforcing equilibria. Members
might not regard them as ideal, but they realize that if they renege, they
would be in a worse position.
Violations of domestic autonomy that are coercive are less likely to be
stable. The Soviet Union was able to guarantee communist regimes in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe for more than forty years, but, in the end, Marxism-
Leninism collapsed when Gorbachev decided that the use of force would
undermine his own efforts at internal reform. The United States has not
been able to create liberal democratic regimes in the Caribbean and Cen-
tral America and, in the case of Cuba, was unable to exclude a major Euro-
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pean power from what had been its accepted sphere of influence. During
the 19th century and after the first world war, the major powers of Europe
wanted to guarantee minority rights in the Balkans for security and human-
itarian reasons, but their efforts failed because compliance was never vol-
untary. The target states had accepted minority rights protections only
because they were anxious to secure international recognition. Once recog-
nition had been accorded, it was difficult to withdraw. The major powers
were not willing to deploy other forms of leverage, such as the use of mili-
tary force or economic sanctions, that might have secured adherence to
both international and domestic legal commitments. Tens of thousands of
troops guaranteed a cessation of fighting in the Balkans in the mid-1990s,
but these most recent efforts to establish peace and stability can only suc-
ceed with the support of indigenous interests that believe adherence to
minority rights is in their own best interest.
The international system is a particularly fragile institutional environ-
ment. There is no source of final authority. There are dramatic asymme-
tries in the power of different actors. Different states have different values.
This has not prevented statesmen from finding stable solutions to critical
issues. The most important feature of stable and effective solutions has
been voluntary acceptance by the actors involved. Stability requires con-
formity with power and interests, not with conventional notions of what
constitutes a sovereign state. Semi-sovereignty is not a problem; in many
ways it has been the norm and sometimes it is the solution to what would
otherwise be intractable dilemmas.
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